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OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

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TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS				
4	DD/NFA		X		
5	DD/A				
6	DD/O		X		
7	DD/S&T				
8	GC				
9	LC				
10	IG				
11	Compt				
12	D/PA				
13	D/EE0				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/ExStf				
16	AO/DCI				
17	NIO/NESA	X			
18	C/NESA/DDO		X		
19					
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22					
SUSPENSE		1400 23 December			
		Date			

Remarks:

Please prepare response for Admiral Inman's signature as Acting DCI. (Handcarry via EYES ONLY envelopes.)


 Executive Secretary

21 Dec 81

Date

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SYSTEM II

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 21, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
The Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive Number 16
for Libya

National Security Decision Directive Number 16 of December 10, 1981 lists the President's economic and security decisions for Libya.


Item 8 of the NSDD states that:

The Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of Central Intelligence shall report to the National Security Council on diplomatic and military steps required to deter Soviet military involvement in light of Presidential decisions.

At Tab A are the Terms of Reference for the study of Soviet Responses to U.S. Military Actions Against Libya. These Terms of Reference are the product of an interagency process, culminating in a meeting of the Libyan Task Force on December 15, 1981.

It is requested that your inputs on Soviet reactions be sent to me by COB December 23, 1981.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


James W. Nance

Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

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Terms of Reference for Study
of Soviet Responses to
U.S. Military Actions Against Libya

1. Current Status of Soviet-Libyan Military Cooperation

- Numbers and functions of Warsaw Pact/Cuban advisors. (CIA)
- Previous Soviet attempts to obtain anchorage or bases, including Libyan responses. (JCS)
- Analysis of reasons for Libyan overbuilding/overstocking and Soviet potential to fly-in and breakout that equipment, pre-positioned stocks. (CIA)
- Analysis of value of Libya to Soviets from Soviet perspective; description of seriousness with which they would regard loss of or damage to Qadhafi's operations. (CIA/DIA/STATE)

2. U.S. Military/Diplomatic Responses to Libyan Provocations and Soviet Responses

- Enumeration of JCS options for responding to Libyan provocation. (JCS)
- Likely Soviet responses: diplomatic, propaganda, military. Military measures examined should range from additional military sales and advisors to Soviet military interference with U.S. forces during U.S. operations and deployment of Soviet forces to Libya. (STATE/CIA/OSD)
- U.S. responses to Soviet moves: diplomatic and military. Should also consider consequences to U.S., both diplomatic and military. Should propose moves we could take in advance to affect Soviet decision-making. (STATE/OSD).

3. Regional Implications of Soviet and Soviet Surrogate Responses

- Examine security implications for Libya's neighbors--Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia--of responses by the Soviet Union or its surrogates, e.g., introduction of Soviet, Cuban, Ethiopian, Syrian forces into Libya. (STATE/OSD)
- Consider steps U.S. should take to deal with these implications, e.g., enhanced security assistance, deployments to friendly countries in the region. (STATE/OSD)

4. Soviet Responses to U.S. Economic Sanctions

- Estimate possible/probable Soviet reactions to U.S. application of economic sanctions--either a cutoff of oil purchases or a total embargo of exports to Libya. (CIA)
- Discuss U.S. measures to deal with these contingent reactions. (STATE/OSD/TREASURY)

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Cl. by James W. Nance

DATE

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